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Recent experimental economic research highlights the importance of Altruism and prosociality in many 
economic relations. Our experiment replicates the cross-cultural public goods game experiment 
conducted in 16 different countries by (Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter 2008). We find that the mean 
contributions in standard public goods experiment with voluntary contribution in Tbilisi participant pool 
appears the highest compared to 16 experiment participant pool of different countries. Moreover, our 
experimental results show surprisingly flat pattern of mean contributions, indicating on strong evidence 
of altruism and prosociality. Individual level experimental data tentatively suggests, the repeated game 
incentives and considerable portion of altruism seems to reinforce each other and motivate subjects' 
genuine generosity reputation building, as it is a distinct and esteemed character of Georgian culture. In 
our view, our results of strong evidence of altruism contributes to the cross-cultural economic research 
of human cooperation.  
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In Economic theory it is well known fact that voluntary provision of public goods will lead to an 
inefficient undersupply (Samuelson 1954) and free riding incentives emerges as a main obstacle. 
Economic theory explains this by viewing contributions to a public good as strategies in a non-
cooperative game. Based on standard assumptions of self-interest and rationality, the Nash equilibrium 
of games involving cooperation decisions is inefficient. Since, one can receive a benefit of public good 
without contributing towards the cost of its production, there exists a tension between individual and 
collective interest, which is typical for many cooperation problems in economics. 
 
Indeed, many important social and economic problems of humankind involve a large-scale cooperation 
of individuals in situations in which collective welfare is jeopardized by individual self-interest. In 
economic literature, the “tragedy of the commons” is probably the best-known example. Collective 
welfare is threatened by individual greed in such diverse areas like environmental protection, tax 
compliance, fighting corruption, labor contract, the voluntary provision of public goods, donations to 
charities, collusion between firms and so on. While the logic of self-interest is straightforward, the 
experimental research data seem to be at odds with the free rider hypothesis that is derived under the 
joint assumptions of rationality and selfishness. Humans often manage to avoid the “tragedy of the 
commons” and achieve high levels of prosociality. Thus, understanding prosocial behavior of 
cooperation is an important challenge not only in economics, but also across all social sciences.  
 
The fact that people take part in collective actions and care about collective welfare, suggests that the 
strict self-interest hypothesis is inconsistent with the degree of voluntary cooperation we observe in real 
life. Besides, the main finding from a large body of experiments that have been conducted in a variety of 
settings in the last three decades is that there is much more cooperation contrary to the predictions of 
standard economic theory (Ledyard 1995, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). However, the experiments also 
show that voluntary cooperation is fragile in the sense that in repeatedly played public goods games 
(PGG) cooperation declines over time under the influence of free riders.  
 
Recent experiments have also shown that cross-cultural differences in cooperation exist among societies 
with the wide range of cultural and economic backgrounds (Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter 2008) 
(henceforth HTG). Our experiment adds Georgia to the cross-cultural study of HTG and replicates their 
experiment design of public goods game experiment. This article presents attempt to measure with the 
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help of controlled laboratory experiment human prosociality in Georgia. The main goal of our experiment 
was to see whether and at what level cooperation stabilized in case of Georgia and compare it to the 




1. Experiment Design 
 
Laboratory experiments are probably the best tool for studying prosociality empirically. The reason is 
that in the field many factors are operative at the same time. The laboratory allows for a degree of control 
that is often not feasible in the field. The experiment design of seminal study by E. Fehr and S. Gächter 
has become the standard by which to study cooperation in a public goods environment (Fehr and Gächter 
2000). Since, we were interested in whether people behave differently under the exact same 




In order to hold participant pool comparability with HTG and minimize sociodemographic variability, 
we conducted experiment with university students who were similar in age. The experiment was 
conducted in Autumn 2020 in Tbilisi, Georgia and included observations made on 57 subjects. 
Participants were recruited via various Facebook groups of university students. The participants were 
registered online on experiment sessions via Google Forms posted on these Facebook groups page and 
advertised on our special Facebook page. We prevented repeated participation by excluding duplicate 
IDs and IP addresses. In total 3 experiment sessions were conducted. In the standard Public Goods Game 
(PGG) with 10 periods the experiment lasted between 10 and 20 min and participants earned on average 
13.7 GEL (4.2 USD at that time).2 After finalizing experiment, the participants were paid immediately 
by internet banking transfer, as soon as participant provided electronically signed payment document. 
The average age of participants in the sample was 24.6 years, and 58.4% were female. The participants 
were from various majors, namely: 21% of participants were students from Economics, 17.8% of 
Business Administration, Social Sciences 8.4%, Law 8.8%, other majors 22% and non-students 22%. 
About 58% of students were from Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University and remaining students 
                                                          
2 According to the official statistics of Georgia average hourly salary in QII 2020 was 8.5 GEL (about 2.6 USD), source: 
https://www.geostat.ge/ka/modules/categories/39/khelfasebi   
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were from various universities, mainly from capital Tbilisi, some of them were from Batumi and Gori 
city universities.  
 
1.2 Method  
 
Our work parallels and replicates the experimental setting used by E. Fehr and S. Gächter and cross-
cultural seminal study of HTG. HTG conducted standard PGG experiment in 16 different participant 
pools with various cultural and economic backgrounds. Their study show that prosocial cooperators is 
indeed widespread in many participant pools. However, a large variation and heterogeneity of 
prosociality remains between these cultures. Here we focus only on measurement of prosociality in case 
of Georgia and comparing it to these 16 different country participant pools. We adjust group size and 
endowed token amount to the parameters of HTG. Next, we kept the group composition constant across 
all periods and was made public knowledge as we wanted to measure the cooperative behavior 
development under strategic settings. When play a repeated game that opens up the possibility for 




1.3 Payoff Mechanism 
 
 
The experiment is based on voluntary contributions mechanism PGG with linear payoffs. In each period 
each of the n subjects in a group receives an endowment of  𝛾 tokens. A subject can either keep these 
tokens for herself or invest 𝑔𝑖 tokens (0 ≤ 𝑔𝑖 ≤ 𝛾) into a project. The decisions about 𝑔𝑖 are made 
simultaneously. The monetary payoff for each subject i in the group is given by 
 
(1) 𝜋𝑖1 = 𝛾 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛼 ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑗=1   ,  0 < 𝝰 < 1 < n𝝰 
 
In each period, where 𝛼 is the marginal per capita return from a contribution to the public good. The total 
payoff from the no-punishment condition is the sum of the period payoffs, as given in (1), over all ten 
periods. Note that (1) implies that full free-riding (𝑔𝑖 = 0) is a dominant strategy in the stage game. This 
follows from  




However, the aggregate payoff  ∑ 𝜋𝑖1𝑛𝑖=1 is maximized if each group member fully cooperates (𝑔𝑖 = 𝛾) 
because 𝜕 ∑ 𝜋𝑖1𝜕𝑔𝑖 =  −1 + 𝑛𝛼 > 0𝑛𝑖=1  
 
 
1.4 Parameters and Information Conditions 
 
 
The study was conducted in native Georgian language using the LIONESS software platform for 
interactive online experiments (Arechar, Gächter, and Molleman 2018). The experiment took place 
anonymously, participants were not informed about the identity of their group members. In all treatment 
conditions the endowment is given by 𝛾 = 20, groups are of size 𝑛 = 4, the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) that a participant obtained from their contributions was fixed at 𝛼 = 0.375. Each of the four 
group members earned 0.375 tokens for each token invested in the project, regardless of whether he or 
she contributed any. The resulting number of points was than divided equally between the four 
participants in the group, irrespective of how much each person contributed. Because the cost of 
contributing one token in the project was exactly one token whereas the return on that token was only 
0.375 tokens, keeping all one’s own tokens was always in any participant's material self-interest, 
irrespective of how much the group members contributed. Yet, if each group member retained all of his 
or her tokens, there were no earnings to be shared; on the other hand, each member would earn 0.375 × 
80 = 30 tokens if each of them invested their entire 20 token endowment. Thus, contributions benefited 
the group as a whole, but the individual always earned the most by not contributing. 
 
Players made their contribution decisions simultaneously and once the decisions were made, they were 
informed about their group members' contributions. To ensure that participants did not have varying 
expectations of the length of the game, the total number of rounds was made public knowledge. Once 
participants entered experiment, they were taken to an introductory page where general instructions were 
explained in detail. To maximize data quality, we required game comprehension prior to playing the 
PGG: after reading the instructions, participants could not advance to the game until they correctly 










Quite unexpectedly, the mean contributions overall exhibit surprisingly flat pattern and voluntary 
contributions across all rounds remain quite high, well above 50%. The mean contributions averaged 
14.1 tokens. However, as it is typical for this kind of public goods experiments, in the last period it 
experiences a pronounced endgame effect by sharp drop (two-tailed paired t-test, differences between 
period 1 and period 10, t = 2.06, p = 0.042). In the last period, 22% percent of the subjects contributed 
zero. This indicates that, the Nash equilibrium retains substantial drawing power.  
 
 
Figure 1: Average contributions 
 
 
Source: own experiment data and HTG experiment data - https://datadryad.org/stash/dataset/doi:10.5061/dryad.87301 
 
In comparison to the average contributions of 16 participant pools of the experiment conducted by HTG, 
the average contributions of our experiment in Tbilisi remains at the top level of contributions, while all 
others mean contributions end up under 50%. The right side of Figure 1 provides list of 16 participant 
pool indicating in parenthesis the average contribution of 10 periods. The average contributions of PGG 
experiment conducted in Tbilisi is significantly higher to the average contributions of Copenhagen 
experiment, which was the highest compared to the 16 country results (two-tailed paired t-test, t = 2.85, 




Why average contributions in Tbilisi participant pool are significantly higher than average contributions 
documented in 16 participant pool? We take a closer look to the data of HTG experiment and examined 
share of free riders and altruist in experiments with “Top 3” and “Bottom 3” average contributions, and 
compared to the results of Tbilisi experiment. The interaction of the free riders and altruist bares a crucial 
importance in recent theoretical and empirical research of behavioral economics (Fehr and Fischbacher 
2003). In experimental research these two types of behavior is well defined (Fischbacher, Gächter, and 
Fehr 2001). Namely, “Free-riders” are those who contribute nothing in all periods in PGG. The 
“Altruists” are those who contribute full endowment in all periods regardless what other group members 
do. In Table 1 shows these results.   
 
Table 1: Share of Free Riding and Altruistic Behavior 





  Georgia Tbilisi  17.5% 0% 





 Denmark Copenhagen  3% 6% 
Ukraine Dnipropetrovsk  5% 2 
Belarus Minsk  6% 0% 








Australia Melbourne  0% 13% 
Turkey Istanbul  2% 13% 
Greece Athens  0% 7% 
 
In participant pool of Tbilisi experiment, we can observe a zero free riding and considerable share of 
Altruist behavior relative to Top 3 participant pool results. Table 1 reveals that in Top 3 participant pool, 
the share of free riding behavior is larger than in Bottom 3, which is logical. 
 
Since, altruist behavior was distinctively higher in participant pool of Tbilisi experiment, we compared 
it to all 16 participant pool of the experiment of HTG. Figure 2 presents an interesting fact, the share of 
altruist behavior of Tbilisi experiment participant pool is considerably higher compared to other 16 
experiment participant pool of HTG study.  
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Figure 2: Share of Altruists 
 
 
Next, we were interested how total contributions of all subjects were distributed across all 10 periods of 
Tbilisi experiment. We classify the contributions into four category: (1) zero (2) full contribution (3) 
contribution equal or more than 50% of endowment and (4) contribution less than 50% of endowment. 
Figure 3 depicts this distribution results. 
 























































Over all 10 periods, 47% of total contributions were equal to full endowment (i.e. 20 tokens) and 29% 
of contributions were above 50% of endowment. Thus, in total 76% of contributions made were equal or 
more than 50% of endowment, which clearly is classified as generous acts.  
 
In the experimental research it is well documented that large portion of subjects are 40-60% conditional 
cooperators i.e. those who contribute only if other group members contribute and stop contributing if 
other group members do not contribute (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 
2001). Based on this logic, as more dominates altruistic behavior the individuals’ interaction, the grater 
is stimulus for conditional cooperators to line-up their behavior to altruistic one. However, it is well 
observed from many PGG experiments that even small number of free riders can easily undermine 
cooperation. Our results tentatively suggest that considerable portion of altruistic behavior to gather with 
reputation formation possibility in repeated interactions, seems to be the driving force of generous and 






Our experiment results highlights the importance of human altruism in long-term economic relations. 
Indeed society with significant part of altruists would serve a fertile ground for development of more 
efficient economic interactions, although it remains vulnerable to free riding. The mean contributions in 
standard public goods experiment with voluntary contribution in Tbilisi participant pool appears the 
highest compared to 16 experiment participant pool of different countries. More interestingly, mean 
contributions exhibit surprisingly flat pattern, indicating on strong evidence of altruism. Indeed, altruistic 
behavior appeared considerably higher in the Tbilisi experiment participant pool compared to 16 
experiment participant pool of different countries. As our individual level experimental data tentatively 
suggests, the repeated game incentives and considerable portion of altruism seems to reinforce each other 
and motivate subjects' genuine generosity reputation building, as it is a distinct and esteemed character 
of Georgian culture. In our view, our results of strong evidence of altruism and prosociality contributes 
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